Description
A spatial equilibrium model is used to demonstrate different ways of modeling market behavior. Competitive and Monopolistic markets are modeled using consumers' and producers' surplus. A Cournot-Nash Oligopoly model is solved by a Diagonalization or Jacobi algorithm.
Small Model of Type : NLP
Category : GAMS Model library
Main file : harker.gms
$title Models of Spatial Competition (HARKER,SEQ=85)
$onText
A spatial equilibrium model is used to demonstrate different
ways of modeling market behavior. Competitive and Monopolistic markets
are modeled using consumers' and producers' surplus. A Cournot-Nash
Oligopoly model is solved by a Diagonalization or Jacobi algorithm.
Network structure:
one two three demand and supply points
/ \ \ /
/ \ \ /
four -- five -- six transport nodes
linear demand function: demand(price) = (rho - price)/eta
linear marginal cost function: cost(supply) = alpha + 2*beta*supply
transport cost: cost(t(ij)) = kappa(ij)*t(ij) + nu(ij)*t(ij)^3
Harker, P T, Alternative Models of Spatial Competition. Operations
Research 34, 3 (1986), 410-425.
Keywords: nonlinear programming, spatial equilibrium model, micro economics,
market behavior, competitive markets, monopolistic markets, Cournot-Nash
oligopoly
$offText
Set
n 'nodes' / one, two, three, four, five, six /
l(n) 'regions' / one, two, three /;
Alias (l,lp), (n,np);
Table coefs(l,*) 'demand and supply data'
alpha beta rho eta
one 1.0 .5 19 .2
two 2.0 .4 27 .01
three 1.5 .3 30 .3 ;
Table pairs(n,np,*) 'transport data'
kappa nu
one.four 1 .5
one.five 2 .2
two.six 3 .3
three.six 1 .4
four.one 2 .3
four.five 1 .1
four.six 1 .1
five.one 3 .5
five.four 2 .2
five.six 1 1.0
six.two 2 .25
six.three 2 .2
six.four 1 .9
six.five 3 .8;
Set arc(n,np) 'active arcs';
arc(n,np) = pairs(n,np,"kappa");
Positive Variable
t(n,np) 'transport'
tt(l,lp) 'notional o-d flows'
d(n) 'demand'
s(n) 'supply';
Variable obj 'objective value';
Equation
bal 'supply demand balance'
sbal(l) 'supply balance'
dbal(l) 'demand balance'
nbal(n) 'node balance'
in(l) 'inflow balance'
objdef 'objective definition'
objoli 'objective definition oligopoly';
Scalar
pm 'product market type'
tm 'transport market type';
bal.. sum(l, d(l)) =e= sum(l, s(l));
nbal(n).. s(n)$l(n) + sum(arc(np,n), t(arc)) =e= d(n)$l(n) + sum(arc(n,np), t(arc));
objdef.. obj =e= sum(l, coefs(l,"rho")*d(l) - pm*coefs(l,"eta")*sqr(d(l)))
- sum(l, coefs(l,"alpha")*s(l) + coefs(l,"beta")*sqr(s(l)))
- sum(arc, pairs(arc,"kappa")*t(arc)
+ tm*pairs(arc,"nu")*power(t(arc),3));
Model hark / bal, nbal, objdef /;
Parameter
rep1 'transport summary'
rep2 'supply demand and price summary';
s.l(l) = 25;
d.l(l) = 25;
* 1. classical spatial price equilibrium: perfectly competitive
* producers and suppliers facing average cost pricing
* of transportation:
pm = .5;
tm = 1/3;
solve hark maximizing obj using nlp;
rep1(arc, "cspe2") = t.l(arc);
rep2("supply",l,"cspe2") = s.l(l);
rep2("demand",l,"cspe2") = d.l(l);
rep2("price ",l,"cspe2") = coefs(l,"rho") - coefs(l,"eta")*d.l(l);
* 2. monopoly pricing equilibrium in which the firm owns both
* means of production and distribution network (hence, marginal
* cost pricing prevails at both the factory and the railhead):
pm = 1;
tm = 1;
solve hark maximizing obj using nlp;
rep1(arc, "monop1") = t.l(arc);
rep2("supply",l,"monop1") = s.l(l);
rep2("demand",l,"monop1") = d.l(l);
rep2("price ",l,"monop1") = coefs(l,"rho") - coefs(l,"eta")*d.l(l);
* 3. monopoly pricing equilibrium in which the firm uses the
* distribution network with average cost pricing:
pm = 1;
tm = 1/3;
solve hark maximizing obj using nlp;
rep1(arc, "monop2") = t.l(arc);
rep2("supply",l,"monop2") = s.l(l);
rep2("demand",l,"monop2") = d.l(l);
rep2("price ",l,"monop2") = coefs(l,"rho") - coefs(l,"eta")*d.l(l);
* 4. multi-producer oligopoly model with average cost pricing
* of transportation links:
pm = 1;
tm = 1/3;
* Additional equation required to solve the a Cournot-Nash
* Oligopoly model by a Diagonalization or Jacobi algorithm.
*
* note the use of d.l(l)-tt.l(lp,l) which holds the values of the
* previous iteration
Variable tt(l,lp) 'notional o-d flows';
Equation
sbal(l) 'supply balance'
dbal(l) 'demand balance'
in(l) 'inflow balance'
objoli 'objective definition oligopoly';
sbal(l).. s(l) =e= sum(lp, tt(l,lp));
dbal(l).. d(l) =e= sum(lp, tt(lp,l));
in(l).. d(l) =e= tt(l,l) + sum(arc(n,l), t(arc));
objoli.. obj =e= sum(l, coefs(l,"rho")*d(l) - pm*coefs(l,"eta")
* sum(lp, (d.l(l) - tt.l(lp,l) + tt(lp,l))*tt(lp,l)))
- sum(l, coefs(l,"alpha")*s(l) + coefs(l,"beta")*sqr(s(l)))
- sum(arc, pairs(arc,"kappa")*t(arc)
+ tm*pairs(arc,"nu")*power(t(arc),3));
Model harkoli / nbal, sbal, dbal, in, objoli /;
Set iter 'iteration count' / iter1*iter20 /;
Parameter
objold 'previous objective'
irep(iter,n,np) 'iteration summary';
option irep:8:1:2, limCol = 0, limRow = 0;
tt.l(l,lp) = 1;
objold = 0;
harkoli.objVal = 1;
loop(iter$(abs(objold - harkoli.objVal) > 1e-5),
objold = harkoli.objVal;
solve harkoli maximizing obj using nlp;
harkoli.solPrint = %solPrint.Quiet%;
irep(iter,arc) = t.l(arc);
);
display irep;
rep1(arc, "oligop") = t.l(arc);
rep2("supply",l,"oligop") = s.l(l);
rep2("demand",l,"oligop") = d.l(l);
rep2("price ",l,"oligop") = coefs(l,"rho") - coefs(l,"eta")*d.l(l);
display rep1, rep2;